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A Mock Funeral for a First Amendment Double 
Standard: Containing Coercion in Secondary 
Labor Boycotts 
Dan Ganin∗ 
Amidst a series of plangent marches, union members 
staged a mock funeral procession outside a Florida hospital in 
March 2004.1 Through this bit of ambulatory street theater, the 
union was not protesting the treatment of hospital employees 
nor the quality or cost of medical care.2 Rather, it was objecting 
to the labor practices of two subcontractors retained by the 
hospital to perform construction and staffing work.3 The union 
hoped that by inducing hospital clients to withhold their patro-
nage they could persuade the hospital to sever commercial ties 
with the subcontractors.4 In the parlance of labor law, this type 
of protest is referred to as a “secondary boycott” and it is regu-
lated under provisions of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), which prohibits unions from “coercing” secondary par-
ties into terminating economic relations with any other person 
or entity.5  
Two federal appellate courts were charged with determin-
ing whether the mock funeral could be enjoined under the sec-
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my friends and family. I would also like to thank Alexis Gerber and the inva-
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Crow for injecting a modicum of sanity and repose into scholarly travails.  
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 1. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 
432–33 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 2. See Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d 
1259, 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2005) (detailing how the union had a primary la-
bor dispute with two nonunion contractors, rather than the hospital itself ). 
 3. Id. at 1261. 
 4. Id. at 1263, 1266. 
 5. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2000). 
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ondary boycott provision as coercive activity.6 In deciding the 
issue, the two circuits arrived at wildly inconsistent conclu-
sions. For the Eleventh Circuit, the boycott was tantamount to 
an illegal and constitutionally unprotected labor picket.7 For 
the D.C. Circuit, however, the activity was a protected form of 
expression that could not be deemed illicitly coercive.8 Beyond 
the narrow confines of the dispute, this division encapsulates 
the vacillating history of judicial approaches to secondary labor 
boycotts. Specifically, it reflects two issues that have persis-
tently plagued courts: how do we understand the ban on sec-
ondary coercion, and how does this understanding comport 
with free speech guarantees? 
Once accorded full First Amendment protection,9 peaceful 
secondary labor picketing is now subject to virtual, if not abso-
lute, prohibition.10 Conversely, “public issue” picketing has re-
ceived robust constitutional protection as an exalted exercise of 
political speech.11 Although several justifications have been 
given for the disparity in treatment, none adequately account 
for the selective exclusion of labor picketing. In a subtle and 
possibly inadvertent way, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the 
indefensibility of affording labor protests diminished constitu-
tional protection.12 Taking these latent insights as a focal point, 
this Note argues that the constitutional asymmetry between 
labor and political speech, especially with regard to picketing, 
amounts to impermissible content-based regulation. To avoid 
this quandary, this Note proposes a new methodology for inter-
 
 6. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 438–39; Kentov, 418 
F.3d at 1263–64. 
 7. Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1265–66. 
 8. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 439. 
 9. See Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 325–26 (1941) (“A 
state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free 
communication . . . .”); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103–05 (1940) 
(“[T]he State in dealing with the evils arising from industrial disputes may 
[not] impair the effective exercise of the right to discuss freely industrial rela-
tions which are matters of public concern.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1265 (noting the “longstanding Supreme 
Court precedent” that secondary labor picketing can be prohibited “without 
implicating the First Amendment”). 
 11. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909–11, 913–15 
(1982) (“This Court has recognized that expression on public issues ‘has al-
ways rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’” 
(quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))). 
 12. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 436–39 (conceding 
that a secondary labor boycott must be evaluated in a manner consistent with 
general First Amendment principles and precedent). 
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preting the ban on secondary coercion to ensure that labor pro-
tests are not subject to unwarranted, disproportionate, and ul-
timately unconstitutional restriction. 
Part I of this Note examines the historical treatment of la-
bor picketing under both the First Amendment and the NLRA, 
the emergence of a constitutional double standard between la-
bor and political protests, and the conflicting judicial approach-
es to the concept of coercion. Part II discusses the radical im-
port of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Sheet Metal Workers’ 
International Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB,13 why it may herald a 
significant change in the protection and analysis of labor 
speech, and why it should be followed regardless of any specul-
ative historical impact. Part III then proposes a new methodol-
ogy for interpreting coercion to ensure that it remains within 
First Amendment bounds. To this end, this Note advocates an 
objective reasonable person test, limited by a principle of for-
mal equality between labor and political protests, to determine 
whether labor picketing is truly coercive and, thus, subject to 
constitutional interdiction. 
I.  CYCLES AND RUPTURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF SECONDARY LABOR BOYCOTTS   
A. SECONDARY LABOR BOYCOTTS AND THE NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS ACT 
Labor protests are conventionally categorized into two gen-
eral types: primary boycotts and secondary boycotts.14 As a de-
finitional matter, both species of dissent entail the withholding 
of social or economic relations to express disfavor or exert eco-
nomic pressure.15 Implementing these measures may involve 
an array of tactics, including picketing, speech, dissemination 
of literature, or a combination thereof.16 What differentiates 
 
 13. See id.  
 14. See, e.g., JOHN W. WHITEHEAD, THE RIGHT TO PICKET AND THE FREE-
DOM OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 140–41 n.24 (1984) (defining primary and second-
ary boycotts). 
 15. See BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, INC., THE LABOR REFORM LAW 84 
(1959) [hereinafter LABOR REFORM LAW] (defining boycott as a refusal to deal 
with or patronize a business); Brian K. Beard, Comment, Secondary Boycotts 
After DeBartolo: Has the Supreme Court Handed Unions a Powerful New 
Weapon?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 217, 218 (1989) (defining boycott as a “withholding 
of business relations by expressing disapproval or by coercion”). 
 16. Barbara J. Anderson, Comment, Secondary Boycotts and the First 
Amendment, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 811, 814 (1984). 
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the two types of protest, however, is the immediate target or 
site of the advocacy. In a primary boycott, pressure is directly 
applied to an employer or business with whom there is a prin-
cipal labor dispute.17 In a secondary boycott, however, pressure 
is brought to bear on a “neutral” party with the aim of inducing 
alliance against the primary target—typically through the se-
verance of business relations.18 Under the rubric of secondary 
boycotts, a union may directly apply pressure to a neutral or 
secondary business, it may urge a secondary’s employees to re-
strict their labor, or it may seek to influence consumers to cur-
tail their patronage of a secondary business.19 The latter form 
of protest is commonly referred to as a secondary consumer 
boycott.20 
Secondary labor activity is regulated under the provisions 
of the NLRA.21 Specifically, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) makes it an 
unfair labor practice for unions “to threaten, coerce, or restrain 
any person” with the object of compelling that person “to cease 
doing business with any other person.”22 As the statutory text 
indicates, section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not categorically proscribe 
all labor boycotts.23 Rather, it regulates the means through 
 
 17. WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 140–41 n.24; Anderson, supra note 16, 
at 813. 
 18. 48A AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 1768 (2005); James At-
leson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: The Perils and Promises of Transna-
tional Labor Solidarity, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 85, 96 (2004). The paradigmatic ex-
ample of a secondary boycott is when a union with a dispute against A 
pressures A indirectly by targeting its clients, suppliers, or other affiliates. Ri-
chard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of 
Section 8(b)(4)(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. 
L. 905, 908 (2005). 
 19. Anderson, supra note 16, at 813–14; see also Atleson, supra note 18, at 
141 (noting the distinction between secondary activities aimed at consumers 
and those aimed at secondary employees).  
 20. Atleson, supra note 18, at 96, 141 (distinguishing between a secondary 
labor boycott and a secondary consumer boycott); Note, Labor Picketing and 
Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 
YALE L.J. 938, 938 n.2 (1982) (defining a secondary consumer boycott as “in-
form[ing] consumers of a strike or other labor dispute involving the employees 
of the picketed business”). 
 21. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2000). 
 22. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). 
 23. See id. (prohibiting threatening or coercive labor activity); see also 
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council 
(DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 578 (1988) (arguing that a violation of NLRA sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) requires a showing of threats, restraints, or coercion). 
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which such measures may be effectuated.24 Two limiting provi-
sos are relevant in this regard. First, the provision expressly 
excludes primary picketing from its ambit.25 Second, the provi-
sion does not encompass “publicity, other than picketing” for 
apprising the public of the existence of a producer-distributor 
relationship between primary and secondary parties.26  
In interpreting the “vague” and “nonspecific” language of 
the secondary boycott provision,27 courts have encountered two 
intertwined difficulties. First, they have struggled to determine 
when a secondary boycott is coercive and, thus, prohibited un-
der the NLRA.28 Second, courts have grappled with the consti-
tutional implications of designating certain activities unlawful-
ly coercive. In recent times, the attempt to answer this question 
has engendered divergent levels of constitutional protection for 
labor and nonlabor speech, particularly with regard to picket-
ing. This two-tiered constitutional approach, however, has not 
always predominated. 
1. From Illegality to Constitutional Protection: An Early 
History of Labor Boycotts 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
secondary labor boycotts were per se illegal and, thus, unpro-
tected from governmental encroachment.29 The common law 
view of illegality rested upon the presumption that secondary 
pressure was inherently and categorically coercive.30 According-
 
 24. Anderson, supra note 16, at 819; Tzvi Mackson-Landsberg, Note, Is a 
Giant Inflatable Rat an Unlawful Secondary Picket Under Section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1519, 
1532 (2006). 
 25. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (“[N]othing contained in this clause (B) 
shall be construed to make unlawful . . . any primary strike or primary picket-
ing . . . .”). 
 26. Id. § 158(b)(4) (“[N]othing contained in such paragraph shall be con-
strued to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully 
advising the public . . . that a product or products are produced by an employer 
with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed 
by another employer . . . .”). 
 27. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28. See, e.g., Kate L. Rakoczy, Comment, On Mock Funerals, Banners, and 
Giant Rat Balloons: Why Current Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the 
National Labor Relations Act Unconstitutionally Burdens Union Speech, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 1621, 1629–30 (2007) (observing the difficulties that courts 
have encountered in articulating the concept of coercion). 
 29. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 69; Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 
24, at 1527. 
 30. WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 70–71; see Beard, supra note 15, at 
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ly, all picketing, no matter how innocuous, was considered in-
timidating, unruly, and especially prone to violence.31  
The common law conception of secondary pressure gradual-
ly eroded as courts began to distinguish boycotts as means of 
placid persuasion from boycotts as crusades of intimidation.32 
Simultaneously, legislative enactments also began to acknowl-
edge the legitimacy of secondary boycotts.33 It would, however, 
take nearly a decade before labor boycotts would receive salient 
constitutional protection. 
Constitutional protection was first extended to peaceful la-
bor picketing in 1940.34 In Thornhill v. Alabama, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a state antipicketing statute on First 
Amendment grounds,35 proclaiming that “labor relations are 
not matters of mere local or private concern” and “must be re-
garded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed 
by the Constitution.”36 In so doing, the Court rejected the com-
mon law conceit that violence was a necessary concomitant of 
picketing.37 Moreover, the Court repudiated any suggestion 
that picketing was not entitled to First Amendment protection 
because it might induce action inconsistent with the economic 
interests of a targeted business.38 Since “[e]very expression of 
opinion” on important matters of public concern may potential-
ly incite “action in the interests of one rather than another” so-
cial group, the Court concluded that those in power could not 
penalize peaceful discussion “merely on a showing that others 
 
218–19. 
 31. WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 70–71; Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 
24, at 1527. Under traditional common law, the idea of peaceful picketing was 
considered as absurdly improbable as “‘chaste vulgarity.’” Edgar A. Jones, Jr., 
Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1024 
(1953).  
 32. WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 71. 
 33. For example, in 1932 Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act ef-
fectively halting the use of injunctive relief to quell union activity, including 
secondary boycotts. See Bock, supra note 18, at 910; Jeff Vlasek, Note, Hold up 
the Sign and Lie Like a Rug: How Secondary Boycotts Received Another Lease 
on Life, 32 J. CORP. L. 179, 182 (2006). 
 34. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940); WHITEHEAD, 
supra note 14, at 72–73.  
 35. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 91–92, 101, 106. 
 36. Id. at 102–03. 
 37. See id. at 105 (“[N]o clear and present danger of destruction of life or 
property . . . or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activi-
ties of every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publiciz-
es the facts of a labor dispute . . . .”). 
 38. See id. at 103–04. 
GANIN_4FMT 5/24/2008  11:38 AM 
2008] SECONDARY LABOR BOYCOTTS 1545 
 
may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with 
[their] interests.”39 
Thus, rather than focusing its inquiry on the effect of the 
protected activity on a picketed employer, the Court focused on 
the relationship between the union as speaker and its intended 
audience—targeted workers or consumers. Based on the fore-
going, the Court stated that labor picketing could only be regu-
lated where a “clear danger of substantive evils arises under 
circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of 
ideas ”40 
Although Thornhill ultimately confronted a primary pick-
et,41 subsequent Supreme Court decisions upheld and expanded 
First Amendment protection to secondary labor picketing. In 
American Federation of Labor v. Swing, the Court held that a 
state could not enjoin a union picket on the grounds that there 
was no immediate employer-employee relationship between the 
boycotters and their target.42 The Court also reaffirmed the 
precept that picketing may not be restricted simply because it 
might engender fiscal harm or loss of patronage.43 Likewise, in 
Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, the Su-
preme Court held that constitutional protection for peaceful 
picketing is not lost merely because the immediate targets of a 
protest are secondary suppliers or customers of a primary em-
ployer.44  
Wohl would, however, presage a retreat from the expansive 
constitutional protection lavished upon labor picketing. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice William Douglas seminally charac-
 
 39. Id. at 104. 
 40. Id. at 104–05. The Court was invoking Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes’s famous formulation of the clear and present danger test for deter-
mining when speech is constitutionally unprotected. See Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
 41. Since Thornhill and his compatriots were picketing their own employ-
er—the entity with whom they had a dispute—the boycott was clearly prima-
ry. See Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 94. Regardless, the Court’s emphasis on the pub-
lic importance of labor speech suggests an expansive principle encompassing 
secondary picketing as well. Id. at 102–03.  
 42. 312 U.S. 321, 325–26 (1941) (“A state cannot exclude workingmen 
from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the cir-
cle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to con-
tain only an employer and those directly employed by him.”). 
 43. Id. at 326 (“Communication by such employees of the facts of a dis-
pute, deemed by them to be relevant to their interests, [cannot] be barred be-
cause of concern for the economic interests against which they are seeking to 
enlist [the] public . . . .”). 
 44. 315 U.S. 769, 772–75 (1942). 
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terized picketing as an instance of “speech-plus,”45 or an amal-
gam of speech and nonspeech elements.46 For Douglas, it was 
precisely the nonspeech elements of picketing (i.e., patrolling) 
that could justify restriction.47 
Less than a decade after Thornhill’s declaration that pick-
eting was a form of protected speech involving matters of public 
concern, however, courts and legislatures were granted sub-
stantial latitude in regulating labor picketing.48 The retraction 
would reach its apogee with the inclusion of an anti-secondary 
boycott provision in the NLRA.49 
2. Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin: Circumscribing 
Secondary Boycotts 
First enacted in 1935,50 the NLRA—commonly known as 
the Wagner Act51—contained a sweeping enunciation of em-
ployee rights without corresponding strictures on union activi-
ty.52 In 1947, amidst a wave of antiunion sentiment, Congress 
 
 45. Activity that combines speech and nonspeech elements has been 
termed “‘speech-plus,’” which is used to distinguish it from “‘pure speech.’” See 
WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 73–75 (emphasis omitted); Atleson, supra note 
18, at 143–44 n.179. The “‘plus’” refers to the conduct element of the activity 
that may trigger a response independent of the ideas conveyed. WHITEHEAD, 
supra note 14, at 75 (emphasis omitted).  
 46. See Wohl, 315 U.S. at 776–77 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Picketing by 
an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a par-
ticular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action 
. . . irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.”). 
 47. Id. Nevertheless, Douglas ultimately maintained the propriety of ro-
bust protection for labor speech. Id. at 777. Somewhat ironically, his remarks 
would later be invoked to curtail this very right. See NLRB v. Retail Store 
Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (invoking the speech-conduct distinction to justify barring labor 
picketing consistent with the First Amendment). 
 48. See LABOR REFORM LAW, supra note 15, at 99 (noting the pronounced 
Supreme Court departure from Thornhill within fifteen years); Julius Get-
man, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited Expression, 
43 MD. L. REV. 4, 12–16 (1984) (describing how post-Thornhill decisions re-
flected a steady retreat from the notion of picketing as a form of protected 
speech); Note, supra note 20, at 941–43 (noting that within a decade of Thorn-
hill an extremely lenient constitutional standard for picketing restrictions was 
adopted).  
 49. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000). 
 50. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000)).  
 51. Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; 
Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125, 146 n.3 (2003). 
 52. See Bock, supra note 18, at 912–13 (discussing how the NLRA did not 
include unfair labor practices by unions until it was amended in 1947); Get-
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amended the Act to prohibit unfair labor practices.53 Section 
8(b)(4)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the precursor to the current 
secondary boycott provision, made it unlawful for a union to 
“encourage the employees of any employer” to strike with the 
aim of forcing that employer to terminate business dealings 
with another.54 Although the term “secondary boycott” did not 
appear in the provision,55 legislative history clearly indicates 
an intent to prevent “wholly unconcerned” parties from becom-
ing ensnared in labor disputes not of their own making.56 
Notwithstanding the congressional purpose underlying sec-
tion 8(b)(4), the statutory language proved inept at circumscrib-
ing union activity directed at neutral parties.57 For example, 
since the prohibition was confined to inducements directed at 
“employees,” it left unions free to apply pressure directly upon 
secondary employers or their customers.58 To eliminate this 
and other perceived loopholes,59 Congress passed the Landrum-
Griffin Act in 1959.60  
One major change wrought by the Landrum-Griffin Act 
was the addition of section 8(b)(4)(ii), which made it an unfair 
labor practice “to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person” with 
the object of compelling that person to cease doing business 
with any other.61 The added provision facially reached both 
 
man, supra note 51, at 125–26 (observing that the Wagner Act contained an 
expansive articulation of employee rights). 
 53. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 
tit. I, sec. 101, § 8(b)(4)(A), 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000)); see Bock, supra note 18, at 912–13; Vlasek, supra 
note 33, at 183.  
 54. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(b)(4)(A).  
 55. See id.  
 56. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 4182, 4198 (1947) (statement of Sen. Taft) 
(“This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure 
the business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement 
between an employer and his employees.”).  
 57. See LABOR RELATIONS & LEGAL DEP’T, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES, LABOR REFORM LAW 1959: THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT 
30–31 (1960); see also NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 
Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 64–65 (1964) (detailing the numerous 
loopholes that became apparent in the Taft-Hartley Act).  
 58. E.g., Bock, supra note 18, at 913–14. 
 59. LABOR REFORM LAW, supra note 15, at 85–88; Bock, supra note 18, at 
913–16.  
 60. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 
86-257, tit. VII, section 704, 73 Stat. 519, 542–43 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (2000)). 
 61. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 8(b)(4)(ii); 
see LABOR REFORM LAW, supra note 15, at 9. 
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secondary employers and their patrons and tightened the ban 
on secondary boycotts by prohibiting consumer picketing at re-
tail sites distributing goods produced by a manufacturer with 
whom the union has a dispute.62  
Although the expansive language of section 8(b)(4)(ii) effec-
tively closed the Taft-Hartley loopholes, some found its sheer 
breadth disquieting.63 Due to concerns that a broad ban on la-
bor publicity would encroach upon otherwise legitimate and 
constitutionally protected activity, the Act was adopted with 
two clarifications.64 First, a clause was inserted to safeguard 
the legality of primary picketing.65 Second, the Act’s scope was 
limited by a “publicity proviso”66 protecting informational activ-
ity, other than picketing, for advertising the existence of a pro-
ducer-distributor relationship between a primary employer and 
a secondary business.67 In an oft-quoted statement explaining 
the import of the publicity proviso, Senator Edward Kennedy 
declared that unions could “carry on all publicity short of hav-
ing ambulatory picketing in front of a secondary site.”68 
3. Secondary Labor Picketing in the Wake of Landrum-Griffin 
The Supreme Court did not address the NLRA’s antiboy-
cott provision until 1964.69 In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Pack-
ers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), a union struck 
fruit pacing companies that sold Washington state apples to 
Safeway supermarkets.70 To further the strike, the union insti-
tuted secondary pickets outside several Safeway stores to per-
suade patrons not to consume the “struck” product. Although 
union members marched before customer entrances, they did 
not impede deliveries or obstruct the ingress of patrons.71 The 
 
 62. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4); see also LABOR REFORM LAW, supra note 15, 
at 9. 
 63. See 105 CONG. REC. 17,818, 17,898–99 (1959) (statement of Sen. Ken-
nedy) (arguing that the provision would curtail legitimate activity); id. at 
6231–32 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (voicing concerns that the secondary 
boycott provision would invade free speech guarantees). 
 64. LABOR REFORM LAW, supra note 15, at 85. 
 65. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). 
 66. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 69 (1964) (discussing the publicity proviso). 
 67. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4); see also Anderson, supra note 16, at 819 (dis-
cussing the two statutory provisos). 
 68. 105 CONG. REC. 17,899 (1959) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 69. Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 24, at 1531. 
 70. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 59–60. 
 71. Id. at 60–61.  
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Court was charged with determining whether the activity was 
coercive under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).72 
Concerned that a “broad ban against peaceful picketing” 
might conflict with free speech guarantees, the Court de-
manded a clear legislative intent to prohibit the type of picket-
ing at issue.73 Scrutinizing the statutory language and legisla-
tive history of Landrum-Griffin, the Court rejected the view 
that Congress intended to prohibit all secondary picketing, par-
ticularly when limited to persuading patrons not to purchase a 
struck product.74 Consequently, the Court drew a polar distinc-
tion between picketing aimed at a struck product and picketing 
exhorting a total cessation of patronage.75 With regard to the 
former, the Court held such picketing to be noncoercive.76 
Echoing Thornhill,77 it rejected the claim that coercion was a 
function of economic loss incurred by a secondary business.78  
Although the Court’s analysis was framed by constitutional 
concerns, the constitutional legacy of Tree Fruits is indetermi-
nate. Because the majority found the picketing noncoercive, 
they failed to address the First Amendment issue.79 In a con-
curring opinion, however, Justice Hugo Black confronted the 
constitutional question, declaring the statutory provision 
invalid.80 For Black, not only was the provision an unconstitu-
tional abridgement of protected speech,81 but it was also an im-
permissible content-based restriction that only banned picket-
ing “when the picketers express particular views.”82 
Black’s First Amendment apprehensions were addressed 
sixteen years later in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 
Local 1001 (Safeco).83 In Safeco, a union embroiled in a dispute 
against an insurance underwriter peacefully picketed several 
title companies that derived over ninety percent of their reve-
nue from the “struck” firm’s policies.84 Holding the boycott to be 
 
 72. See id. at 59. 
 73. Id. at 63. 
 74. Id. at 63–69, 71–73. 
 75. Id. at 63–64. 
 76. Id. at 71–72. 
 77. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103–05 (1940). 
 78. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 72–73. 
 79. See id. at 63–73. 
 80. Id. at 76 (Black, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 79. 
 83. 447 U.S. 607 (1980). 
 84. Id. at 609–10. 
GANIN_4FMT 5/24/2008  11:38 AM 
1550 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1539 
 
coercive in violation of the NLRA,85 the Court blurred the 
sharply delineated distinction drawn in Tree Fruits between 
picketing a struck product and picketing calculated to induce a 
general loss of patronage.86 
Distinguishing Tree Fruits, where the struck product was 
one of many sold,87 Safeco held that secondary picketing di-
rected solely at a struck product nonetheless violates section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) where it threatens a neutral party with “ruin or 
substantial loss.”88 Additionally, the decision modified the ana-
lytical framework for construing the concept of coercion. Al-
though there was no suggestion that patrons were coerced into 
capitulating to union demands, the Court evinced little regard 
for the effect on the immediate recipients of the message.89 Ra-
ther, the Court exclusively focused on the potential fiscal harm 
attending a secondary business.90  
Upon finding the picketing coercive, the Court held that 
the secondary picketing ban did not impermissibly restrict a 
union’s right to free speech.91 While the plurality summarily 
dispensed with the issue,92 Justices Harry Blackmun and John 
Paul Stevens adduced more substantive rationales for the legis-
lative interdiction. Cognizant of the constitutional concerns 
raised by Justice Black in Tree Fruits, Blackmun admonished 
the plurality for failing to consider whether the “content-based 
ban” was constitutional.93 Despite his reproach, Blackmun re-
luctantly deemed the regulation permissible as an instance of 
Congress “striking [a] delicate balance between union freedom 
of expression and the ability of neutral [parties] . . . to remain 
free from coerced participation in industrial strife.”94  
Unlike Blackmun’s special balancing rationale, Justice 
Stevens advanced a “speech-plus” argument redolent of Wil-
 
 85. Id. at 614–15. 
 86. See Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. at 63–64. 
 87. Id. at 60. 
 88. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 614–15. 
 89. See id.  
 90. See id. (holding that product picketing that can be expected to threat-
en neutral parties with significant financial loss “plainly violates the statutory 
ban on the coercion of neutrals”). 
 91. Id. at 616. 
 92. The plurality’s First Amendment analysis was essentially limited to 
the following laconic observation: “As applied to picketing that predictably en-
courages consumers to boycott a secondary business, § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) imposes no 
impermissible restrictions upon constitutionally protected speech.” Id. at 616. 
 93. See id. at 616–17 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 94. Id. at 617–18. 
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liam Douglas’s concurrence in Wohl.95 Over a decade before Sa-
feco, the Court dismissed the proposition that the First 
Amendment bestows “the same kind of freedom to those who 
would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, march-
ing, and picketing” as it affords “those who communicate ideas 
by pure speech.”96 Invoking this speech-conduct dichotomy, 
Stevens opined that “[i]n the labor context, it is the conduct 
element rather than the particular idea being expressed that 
often provides the most persuasive deterrent to third persons 
about to enter a business establishment.”97 On this basis, Ste-
vens found the statutory ban permissible because it affected 
“that aspect of the union’s efforts to communicate its views that 
calls for an automatic response to a signal, rather than a rea-
soned response to an idea.”98 Under the speech-plus doctrine, 
then, labor protests lose their First Amendment protection 
when they persuade by force of conduct rather than cogency of 
ideas. However, under Stevens’s formulation, labor picketing, 
by triggering a reflexive response, always appears to fall out-
side constitutional preserves.99 In the end, it was these concur-
rences that would provide enduring justifications for constitu-
tionally barring labor picketing.100 
4. Antidiscrimination Picketing and the Rise of a First 
Amendment Double Standard 
In 1972, a paladin for racial equality in public education 
challenged the constitutionality of an ordinance banning all but 
labor picketing outside public schools.101 In Police Department 
of Chicago v. Mosley, the Supreme Court held that the ordin-
ance violated First Amendment guarantees because it drew “an 
impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other 
peaceful picketing.”102 For the Mosley Court, not only was pick-
 
 95. See id. at 618–19 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that picketing is a 
mixture of both speech and conduct). 
 96. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).  
 97. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. (indicating that in the labor context, picketing calls for an au-
tomatic response and, thus, is not protected speech). 
 100. See, e.g., Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 
Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing that 
Justice Steven’s Safeco concurrence provided the justification for prohibiting 
picketing within constitutional bounds that a Supreme Court majority would 
eventually adopt). 
 101. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93–94 (1972). 
 102. Id. at 94. 
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eting a form of constitutionally protected communication,103 but 
the First Amendment demanded that government not restrict 
expression because of its content.104 Accordingly, the Court es-
tablished that content-based restrictions on protected speech, 
including picketing, were constitutionally impermissible.105  
On the same day the Safeco decision was rendered,106 the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the content-based principle articu-
lated in Mosley.107 In Carey v. Brown, the Court invalidated an 
ordinance proscribing all picketing, except for labor picketing, 
as a violation of the First Amendment.108 As in Mosley, the 
Court found that the ordinance illegitimately discriminated 
amongst protected speech on the basis of content.109 Rejecting 
the government’s claim that labor picketing was more deserv-
ing of constitutional protection than “public protests over other 
issues,” the Court declared that public-issue picketing “has al-
ways rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values.”110 In a somewhat incongruous turn, how-
ever, the Court transcended the bare assertion that content-
based discriminations are invalid. Rather, the Court insinuated 
that public-issue picketing is more deserving of constitutional 
protection than labor picketing.111 
The distinction between public and private picketing first 
articulated in Carey was fully explicated and endorsed in 
 
 103. Id. at 95. 
 104. Id. at 95–96. 
 105. See id. at 96 (“[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to 
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to ex-
press less favored or more controversial views.”). 
 106. Both Safeco and Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), were decided on 
June 20, 1980. Compare NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 
(Safeco), 447 U.S. 607 (1980), with Carey, 447 U.S. 455. 
 107. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 460, 462–63 (invoking Mosley’s content-based 
principle to invalidate a residential antipicketing ordinance indistinguishable 
from the former’s public forum antipicketing ordinance); see also WHITEHEAD, 
supra note 14, at 89–90. 
 108. Carey, 447 U.S. at 461–63. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. at 466–67. 
 111. The insinuation stems from the Court’s citation to an academic tract 
“suggesting that nonlabor picketing is more akin to pure expression than labor 
picketing and thus should be subject to fewer restrictions.” Id. at 466 (citing 
THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 444–49 
(1970)); see also Beard, supra note 15, at 231 n.132 (noting the suggestion that 
labor picketing is less deserving of constitutional protection than political pro-
tests).  
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NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.112 Claiborne Hardware in-
volved a civil rights boycott of white merchants to secure com-
pliance with a litany of demands for racial equality, including 
desegregation of public facilities and the hiring of black em-
ployees.113 Although primarily supported by speeches and non-
violent picketing, violence, threats, and coercive acts were used 
to bolster boycott participation.114 Nevertheless, a unanimous 
Court held that the nonviolent elements of the boycott, includ-
ing threats of social ostracism and other “coercive” pressure, 
were constitutionally protected.115 Unless the speech involved 
“fighting words,” created a “clear and present danger,” or was 
directed at inciting imminent lawlessness, advocacy of force did 
not remove speech from the purview of the First Amend-
ment.116 Thus, what would have been an illegal and unpro-
tected secondary labor boycott, was accorded full protection in 
the civil rights context. 
Perhaps realizing the potential discrepancy in constitu-
tional protection, the Court was quick to limit its holding to 
nonlabor boycotts.117 The Court attempted to distinguish labor 
and nonlabor picketing on two grounds. First, resurrecting Jus-
tice Blackmun’s special balancing rationale from Safeco,118 the 
Court argued that secondary labor boycotts could be prohibited 
as part of striking a delicate balance between union expression 
and protecting neutral parties from “coerced participation” in 
economic discord.119 Second, citing Carey, the Court announced 
 
 112. 458 U.S. 886, 913–15 (1982); see also Note, supra note 20, at 947–49 
(discussing the incorporation of Carey’s public-private distinction into Court 
doctrine via Claiborne Hardware). 
 113. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 889, 899. 
 114. Id. at 895, 902, 907–10. 
 115. Id. at 909–11. 
 116. Id. at 927–28 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a state can-
not forbid advocacy of illegal action except where it is directed at inciting im-
minent lawlessness and is likely to produce such a result); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (establishing that “fighting words”—
words that provoke imminent violence—are not constitutionally protected (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 
(1919) (proclaiming that words that “create a clear and present danger” are 
not constitutionally protected). The Claiborne Hardware Court explicitly relied 
on these cases in determining whether the boycott activity was constitutional-
ly protected. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 927–28. 
 117. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912–13. 
 118. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 
607, 617–18 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 119. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912. 
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a constitutionally relevant distinction between labor and pub-
lic-issue speech.120 Whereas the former was emblematic of “pa-
rochial economic interests,” the latter was “essential political 
speech lying at the core of the First Amendment.”121 Claiborne 
Hardware thus indicated that labor picketing should be re-
garded as a form of commercial speech122 meriting less consti-
tutional protection than political speech.123  
Claiborne Hardware’s significance, however, exceeds the 
tenet that labor boycotts merit diminished protection because 
they do not involve fundamental public concerns. The Court’s 
decision also differed significantly from its erstwhile analysis of 
labor boycotts. In contrast to Safeco, coercion was not treated 
with respect to the boycotted merchants;124 rather, it was a 
function of the relationship between the boycott advocates and 
their intended audience.125 Additionally, the Court rejected any 
claim that the occurrence of violence was sufficient to condemn 
the entire boycott unless “fear rather than protected conduct 
was the dominant force” behind the enterprise.126 
Interestingly, the political/commercial distinction employed 
in Claiborne Hardware127 had been nearly eviscerated several 
months earlier. In International Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied 
International, Inc., a union refused to handle cargo arriving 
from or destined for the Soviet Union in protest of the Russian 
invasion of Afghanistan.128 The labor abstention, which was 
unaccompanied by picketing, significantly disrupted the busi-
 
 120. Id. at 913 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). 
 121. Id. at 915 (quoting Henry v. First Nat’l Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 
291, 303 (5th Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122. See id. at 912–13. Commercial speech has been defined as speech that 
merely “‘propose[s] a commercial transaction,’” Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (quoting Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 
(1973)), or speech “related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and 
its audience,” Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). Its paradigmatic example is “advertising the price of 
a product or arguing its merits.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast 
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988). 
 123. See, e.g., Beard, supra note 15, at 232. 
 124. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 
607, 614–15 (1980). 
 125. See Getman, supra note 48, at 18 (explaining how Claiborne Hard-
ware’s conception of coercion, which refers to the manner in which people are 
enlisted, differs from the concept as employed in labor boycott cases). 
 126. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 933–34.  
 127. Id. at 913–15. 
 128. 456 U.S. 212, 214 (1982). 
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ness of a domestic importer.129 Although the importer’s com-
plaint was initially dismissed as a primary and political boycott 
beyond the ambit of section 8(b)(4),130 the Court found no ex-
ception for politically based disputes with foreign nations.131 
Because “[t]he distinction between labor and political objectives 
would be difficult to draw in many cases,” the Court refused to 
create a political exemption from the secondary boycott ban.132 
Thus, despite the union’s “understandable and even commend-
able” objective, its actions placed a heavy burden on neutral 
businesses and, accordingly, could be restrained.133  
Moreover, in its most spartan First Amendment analysis to 
date, the Court distilled an epoch of labor jurisprudence into 
one terse proclamation: “We have consistently rejected the 
claim that secondary picketing by labor unions in violation of 
section 8(b)(4) is protected activity under the First Amend-
ment.”134 The withholding of labor, without even a trace of 
picketing, was thus treated as “conduct designed not to com-
municate but to coerce.”135 With these perfunctory remarks, the 
status of secondary labor boycotts appeared to revert to its 
common law roots. Not only were they inherently coercive, but 
the sole criterion of coercion lay in the economic effects attend-
ing a targeted business. 
5. DeBartolo II and Its Progeny: Eroding the Free Speech 
Double Standard 
In Safeco, the Supreme Court “left no doubt that Congress 
may prohibit secondary picketing” directed at consumers.136 It 
did, however, leave open the question of whether a boycott ad-
vanced through other means could be prohibited.137 The ques-
 
 129. Id. at 214–16. 
 130. Id. at 217. 
 131. See id. at 223–25. 
 132. Id. at 225–26. 
 133. Id. at 223. 
 134. Id. at 226. 
 135. Id. 
 136. NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 
607, 616 (1980). 
 137. Safeco merely addressed the status of secondary picketing under the 
NLRA and the First Amendment. See id. at 610, 614–16. The Court did not 
tackle the question of whether Congress had, or could have prohibited other 
means of appealing to secondary consumers. See id. at 610 n.3 (“The distribu-
tion of handbills has not been an issue in this case.”); see also Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (ob-
serving that Safeco “had not spoken to the question” of whether Congress 
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tion was resolved in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf 
Coast Building & Construction Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 
which held that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) does not reach peaceful 
handbilling unaccompanied by picketing or patrolling.138 
In DeBartolo II, a union dispensed handbills outside mall 
entrances to protest the retention of a construction contractor 
by one of the mall’s tenants.139 Although the union’s dispute 
was with the construction company over substandard wages, it 
urged a consumer boycott of all mall stores until the mall own-
er vowed to only use contractors paying fair wages.140 The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) deemed the handbilling a 
form of illicit economic coercion, but the Court disagreed.141 
In the Court’s view, the NLRB’s interpretation raised 
grave constitutional concerns.142 On the one hand, peaceful 
handbilling urging a “wholly legal course of action” was expres-
sive activity.143 On the other hand, the Court abandoned the 
conclusion that labor communications were necessarily a form 
of commercial speech meriting diminished constitutional pro-
tection.144 Rather, the handbills at issue, “press[ing] the bene-
fits of unionism to the community and the dangers of inade-
quate wages to the economy,” were more than typical 
commercial speech advertising product prices or quality.145 As-
sessing coercion from a consumer perspective, the Court found 
that “[t]he loss of customers because they read a handbill urg-
ing them not to patronize a business, and not because they are 
intimidated by a line of picketers, is the result of mere persua-
sion.”146 On this basis, the Court held that the handbilling, be-
reft of picketing, was not coercive under the secondary boycott 
ban.147 The Court also found support for this decision in Sena-
 
could have prohibited “other means of appealing to the customers of the sec-
ondary employer”). 
 138. 485 U.S. 568, 588 (1988). 
 139. Id. at 570–71. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 572–74. 
 142. Id. at 574–77. 
 143. Id. at 575–76. 
 144. See id. at 576 (“We do not suggest that communications by labor un-
ions are never of the commercial speech variety and thereby entitled to a less-
er degree of constitutional protection.”). Although the sentiment was cast in 
negative terms, the Court’s assertion implies that labor communications are 
not categorically commercial. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 580. 
 147. Id. at 588. 
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tor Kennedy’s illustrious statement that unions could engage in 
informational activity “short of . . . ambulatory picketing.”148 
For the Court, this remark indicated that the only activity 
Congress clearly intended to proscribe was ambulatory picket-
ing.149 
As in Tree Fruits,150 the Court obviated the First Amend-
ment question by construing the provision as not reaching the 
challenged activity.151 Nevertheless, the opinion does suggest 
that, if the Court were forced to decide the issue, it would have 
protected the handbilling as political speech.152 In this, and 
other respects, DeBartolo II seemed to revive the principles ar-
ticulated in Thornhill.153 By repudiating the notion that labor 
speech is inherently commercial, by shifting the coercion analy-
sis back to the impact on the direct recipients of speech, and by 
reinstating the idea that not every secondary boycotts is ipso 
facto coercive,154 the decision seemed to herald a return to a by-
gone era.  
That is, however, except for its manifest ambivalence to-
wards picketing. While the Court dismissed the notion that 
“any kind of handbilling, picketing, or other appeal[]” is coer-
cive,155 it also embraced Justice Stevens’s Safeco postulate that 
“picketing is qualitatively different” than handbilling because it 
is “a mixture of conduct and communication” and, thus, subject 
to restrictive regulation.156 Due to this seeming inconsistency, 
commentators have split over whether the case exempts all la-
bor picketing from constitutional protection or merely coercive 
 
 148. Id. at 587 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 17,818, 17,899 (1959) (statement 
of Sen. Kennedy)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149. See id. at 582–84, 588. 
 150. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 63–73 (1964) (failing to address the First Amend-
ment issue because the Court found that the picketing was noncoercive). 
 151. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578 (declaring that the statutory con-
struction obviates the need to decide whether a prohibition on handbilling 
would violate the First Amendment). 
 152. See id. at 576 (refusing to relegate handbilling to the status of mere 
commercial speech).  
 153. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103–05 (1940) (holding that the 
relevant inquiry is the relationship between the union and the intended lis-
teners). 
 154. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 576, 580, 588. 
 155. Id. at 579–80 (emphasis added). 
 156. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safe-
co), 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
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picketing.157 Thus, DeBartolo II raised the question of whether 
the germane distinction is between picketing and nonpicketing, 
or between persuasion and coercion. 
B. SHEET METAL WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASS’N  
In the wake of DeBartolo II, courts have largely adopted 
the picketing/nonpicketing distinction as the key criterion for 
appraising the legality of secondary labor boycotts.158 As such, 
decisions often hinge on labeling.159 Where a union can cogently 
analogize an activity to handbilling, it will be deemed permis-
sible; where it can be characterized as tantamount to picketing, 
it can be enjoined without concern.160 Regardless of result, the 
picketing test ultimately perpetuates the constitutional diffe-
rential so vividly illustrated in Claiborne Hardware. As long as 
secondary labor picketing is absolutely prohibited under the 
NLRA, labor speech will continue to occupy a subaltern space 
in the sphere of public protests. A potentially radical reconside-
ration of this view may be underway. 
1. A Divisive Mock Funeral 
On March 15, 2004, union members staged a mock funeral 
procession outside a medical center in Brandon, Florida.161 As 
four “pallbearers” carried an ersatz coffin, one union member 
donned a grotesquely large Grim Reaper costume complete 
with a plastic scythe.162 Over the course of two hours, the 
“mourners,” accompanied by somber funeral dirges, intermit-
tently traversed a loop one hundred feet from the hospital en-
trance.163 Concurrently, several other union members distri-
buted leaflets entitled “Going to Brandon Hospital Should Not 
Be a Grave Decision,” accurately detailing malpractice suits 
pending against the hospital.164 Despite the theatrics, the pro-
 
 157. See, e.g., Mackson-Landsberg, supra note 24, at 1540–54 (detailing the 
divergent and conflicting interpretations of DeBartolo II ).  
 158. See id. at 1522–23. 
 159. Id. at 1523. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 
431–32 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 
418 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 162. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 432; Kentov, 418 F.3d at 
1261, 1265 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 163. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 432–33. 
 164. Id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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cession was orderly and unobtrusive.165 The marchers did not 
interfere with pedestrian or vehicular traffic, nor did they im-
pede the ingress of hospital patrons.166 Like all secondary boy-
cotts, the union was not directly involved in a dispute with the 
hospital.167 Its primary targets were a staffing agency and con-
tractor employing nonunion labor for a hospital construction 
project.168 The union hoped that by pressuring hospital patrons 
it would induce the hospital to terminate its relationship with 
the subcontractors.169 
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach 
Two days after the procession, the hospital filed a com-
plaint with the NLRB.170 While pending before an administra-
tive law judge (ALJ), the regional director for the NLRB sought 
an interim injunction against the activity.171 Although the dis-
trict court found the procession orderly and placid, it issued a 
temporary injunction barring the union from picketing and 
“staging street theater.”172 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld the injunction.173 Construing DeBartolo II as reaffirm-
ing the longstanding principle that secondary labor picketing 
can be regulated without implicating the First Amendment, the 
court attempted to determine whether the procession was clos-
er to unlawful picketing or lawful handbilling.174 Ultimately, 
the court concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe 
that the funeral procession was the “functional equivalent” of 
picketing and, thus, could be constitutionally enjoined under 
the NLRA.175 The court based this assessment on the finding 
that the union’s activity was calculated to induce the hospital 
to sever business relations and, moreover, that it could be ex-
pected to dissuade patronage.176 
 
 165. Id. at 433. 
 166. Id.; Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1261–62. 
 167. Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1261. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1263, 1266. 
 170. Id. at 1262. 
 171. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 433. 
 172. Kentov, 418 F.3d at 1261–62, 1262 n.4. 
 173. Id. at 1267. 
 174. Id. at 1264–65. 
 175. Id. at 1265–66. 
 176. Id.  
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3. The District of Columbia Circuit’s Approach 
Around the time of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, the ALJ 
concluded that the union violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) because 
the procession constituted an illicit picket that forced bystand-
ers to “cross a death march.”177 Accordingly, the NLRB ordered 
the union to desist from further picketing.178 
The union appealed the NLRB’s order, petitioning the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia for review.179 In 
Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 
the union advanced two intertwined arguments for dissolving 
the injunction. First, it argued that the procession was a form 
of noncoercive expression entitled to full First Amendment pro-
tection.180 Second, it claimed that the injunction constituted a 
repugnant content-based restriction on that right.181 Since the 
mock funeral “could never have been prohibited if it had ex-
pressed opposition to the Hospital’s practices, environmental 
policy, or any other grievance,” applying a different rule in the 
labor context “would be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimina-
tion.”182 Predicated on this theoretical basis, the union argued 
that its activity was consistent with two recent Supreme Court 
abortion protest cases and, thus, should be constitutionally pro-
tected and deemed noncoercive.183 
The District of Columbia Circuit largely agreed.184 The 
court rejected the claim that it should distinguish the abortion 
protest cases because there is a uniquely strong governmental 
interest in regulating labor picketing.185 The NLRB, relying on 
Claiborne Hardware, claimed that secondary labor boycotts 
 
 177. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 433 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 178. Id. at 433–34. 
 179. Id. at 431. 
 180. See id. at 436. 
 181. See id. 
 182. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 183. Id. The union relied on Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 
U.S. 753 (1994), and Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). In Madsen, the 
Court held that an injunction creating a three hundred foot buffer around an 
abortion clinic was an unconstitutional burden on protestors’ First Amend-
ment rights. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773–74. Simultaneously, however, the Court 
upheld the injunction’s thirty-six-foot buffer around clinic entrances. Id. at 
770. In Hill, the Court affirmed the legitimacy of a statute declaring that, 
when within one hundred feet of an abortion clinic, protestors could not come 
within eight feet of their intended target. Hill, 530 U.S. at 729–30.  
 184. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 436–37. 
 185. Id. 
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could be enjoined as part of striking a balance between union 
freedom and the ability of neutral parties to “remain free from 
coerced participation” in economic discord.186 The court, howev-
er, saw the proclamation as providing little guidance for con-
struing the meaning or scope of coercion.187  
The court also rejected its sister circuit’s conclusion that 
the procession was the functional analog of unlawful and un-
protected picketing.188 Admonishing the Eleventh Circuit for 
conflating means and ends, the court noted that it was clearly 
the union’s aim to dissuade patronage.189 As a mechanism for 
achieving this end, however, the court found that the “combina-
tion of street theater and handbilling” lacked all the coercive 
hallmarks of picketing.190 Namely, the procession was noncon-
frontational and it failed to create a physical or symbolic bar-
rier to entry.191 
With the question of coercion lingering, the court conceded 
that the impugned activity, as well as the concept of coercion, 
must be assessed in a manner consistent with general First 
Amendment jurisprudence.192 Applying the Supreme Court’s 
abortion protest decisions, the court concluded that the proces-
sion was consistent with activity held to be constitutionally 
protected.193 Thus, to ensure that coercion was not defined in 
conflict with free speech guarantees, the court declared that 
“nothing [the union] did can realistically be deemed coercive, 
threatening, restraining, or intimidating.”194  
 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. at 437 (“That statement . . . leaves open the question of what 
constitutes ‘coerced participation’ in a labor dispute and, of course, does noth-
ing to suggest coercion may be defined so broadly as to crimp the free speech 
guarantee of the First Amendment.”). 
 188. See id. at 437–38. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 438. 
 192. Id. at 438–39. 
 193. Id. at 439. 
 194. Id.  
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II.  REEVALUATING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION 
FOR LABOR PICKETS   
A. THE LATENT AND LAUDABLE RADICALISM OF SHEET METAL 
WORKERS’ INTERNATIONAL ASS’N 
In many respects, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n 
simply adhered to the substantive principles and methodologi-
cal framework articulated in DeBartolo II. Like the Supreme 
Court, the D.C. Circuit adopted a consumer-based, rather than 
business-based, view of coercion195 and denounced the conten-
tion that every effort at facilitating a secondary consumer boy-
cott is inherently coercive.196 Based on its own reading of De-
Bartolo II, however, the court also maintained that picketing, 
unlike other secondary tactics, is categorically coercive, unlaw-
ful, and constitutionally unprotected.197 
Notwithstanding the similarities, the circuit court’s opinion 
does mark a relatively radical expansion on precedent—albeit 
inconspicuously and inadvertently so. First, the decision aug-
mented the range of permissible and protected union efforts to 
ambulatory activity (i.e., a mock funeral procession).198 Unlike 
DeBartolo II and its progeny, which declined to prohibit largely 
stationary activity such as handbilling or immobile banner-
ing,199 Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n afforded pro-
tection to a fundamentally itinerant activity. Recalling Senator 
Kennedy’s assertion that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) would permit 
“publicity short of having ambulatory picketing,”200 the court 
appears to push the permissible bounds of secondary activity 
 
 195. Compare Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & 
Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 578, 580 (1988) (assess-
ing the coercive impact of a secondary labor boycott from the perspective of 
customers), with Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 438 (assessing 
the coerciveness of a labor boycott from the vantage point of potential pa-
trons). 
 196. Compare DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578–79 (arguing that it is untena-
ble to categorically equate boycott activity with coercion), with Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 437 (arguing that not every secondary boycott 
is coercive and illegal under the NLRA). 
 197. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 437–38. 
 198. See id. at 439. 
 199. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 571, 588 (refusing to prohibit union 
handbilling unaccompanied by picketing or patrolling); Overstreet v. United 
Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 
1201–02, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to enjoin “generally stationary . . . 
bannering activity”). 
 200. 105 CONG. REC. 17,818, 17,899 (1959) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) 
(emphasis added). 
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closer to this asserted limit. As such, it extends the gamut of 
permissible forms of secondary labor activity.  
Second, unlike its predecessors, Sheet Metal Workers’ In-
ternational Ass’n did not exclusively nor predominately rely on 
precepts and precedent from the labor context.201 Rather, the 
court imported First Amendment principles from a nonlabor 
and patently political context (i.e., abortion protests) to deter-
mine the categories of union activity constitutionally immune 
from the NLRA’s secondary boycott ban.202 In so doing, the 
court subtly—though absolutely—denied any distinction be-
tween labor and political speech, implicitly indicating that un-
ions must possess the same First Amendment rights as other 
social groups. In this respect, the decision represents a signifi-
cant and radical departure from recent precedent. 
As previously discussed, DeBartolo II indicated that cer-
tain forms of union communication are not commercial speech 
entitled to diminished constitutional protection, particularly 
where they expressly emphasize the salutary impact of unions 
on the welfare of the general populace.203 Accordingly, where 
union communication presses “the benefits of unionism to the 
community,” then it transcends mere commercial speech.204 
DeBartolo II, thus, eroded the strict equivalence between labor 
and commercial speech. 
While DeBartolo II eroded the nexus between labor and 
commercial speech, Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n 
appears to completely implode the equation. By applying First 
Amendment principles gleaned from a nonlabor and political 
context,205 the D.C. Circuit tacitly denied the political-economic 
distinction altogether as applied to labor speech. Consequently, 
in contrast with DeBartolo II,206 the particular message embla-
zoned on a placard became immaterial to the adjudicative cal-
 
 201. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 577–80 (relying predominately on prin-
ciples set forth in Tree Fruits and Safeco); Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers’ 
Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2005) (relying predom-
inately on DeBartolo II and Safeco); Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1210–14 (relying 
extensively on DeBartolo II and Safeco). 
 202. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 436, 438–39. 
 203. DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 576. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 436, 438–39 (applying 
abortion protest decisions to determine whether labor activity could be prohi-
bited without violating the First Amendment). 
 206. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578 (stating that it is necessary to de-
termine whether the handbilling was threatening or coercive). 
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culus. Finally, and again quite significantly, the court also took 
the unprecedented step—at least in modern times—of acknowl-
edging that different rules or levels of constitutional protection 
for labor and political protests would constitute impermissible 
viewpoint or content-based regulation.207 
Paradoxically, although Sheet Metal Workers’ International 
Ass’n ostensibly applied the picketing-handbilling distinction it 
discerned in DeBartolo II,208 its very reasoning belies the prop-
osition that picketing is a necessarily coercive act that can be 
regulated without constitutional concern. If labor speech is po-
litical speech entitled to full constitutional protection, and if 
any other standard would constitute unconstitutional content-
based regulation, then it follows that labor unions ought to re-
ceive the same level of protection for peaceful picketing af-
forded to other groups. The D.C. Circuit’s own analysis, then, 
implies that union protestors must be accorded the same rights 
to peacefully picket that were bestowed upon the civil rights 
protestors in Claiborne Hardware.209 The decision thus exerts 
pressure on the persistent juridical and legislative double-
standard that effectively states that anyone, except for union 
members, can peacefully picket any target. 
If Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n is a harbinger of 
things to come, it may herald a significant change in First 
Amendment protection for labor-related activity, as well as an 
expansion of permissible secondary tactics. However, even if 
the opinion ultimately fails to portend a significant change, its 
approach to secondary labor activity is preferable to the exist-
ing paradigm. Since the historically espoused rationales for af-
fording labor speech lessened protection are unprincipled and 
unpersuasive, and since that leaves nothing but illegitimate re-
striction based on the content of speech, labor unions ought to 
receive the same constitutional rights to peacefully picket as 
other public protestors.  
B.  THE PROBLEM OF SELECTIVE EXCLUSION: A SERIES OF 
UNPERSUASIVE RATIONALES 
Historically, domestic courts have adduced four main ra-
tionales for prohibiting picketing in general, and selectively 
prohibiting labor picketing in particular. These justifications 
 
 207. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 436, 438–39.  
 208. Id. at 438. 
 209. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 889, 909–11 (1982). 
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can be labeled as follows: (1) the inherently coercive argument, 
(2) the speech-plus argument, (3) the special congressional ba-
lancing rationale, and (4) the labor-speech-as-commercial-
speech argument. None of these traditionally proffered reasons, 
however, adequately or cogently justify drawing a constitution-
al discrepancy between labor and nonlabor communicative con-
duct. 
1. The Inadequacy of the Inherently Coercive Rationale 
The inherently coercive argument asserts that picketing is 
beyond constitutional protection because it is necessarily and 
categorically coercive.210 Although the view originally stems 
from traditional common law,211 it was explicitly reaffirmed in 
International Longshoremen’s Ass’n212 and is implicitly as-
sumed in the picketing/nonpicketing distinction currently em-
ployed.213 Despite its historical tenacity, the argument ulti-
mately fails to justify either the general or selective exclusion 
of otherwise peaceful picketing from constitutional protection. 
There are two cardinal reasons why the inherently coercive 
argument does not support a general exclusion of picketing 
from constitutional protection. First, the view is based on a du-
bious ontological assumption—unsupported by experience or 
empirical evidence—that picketing is always and intrinsically 
coercive.214 It seems highly improbable that pure and abstract 
ratiocination on the inherent attributes or effects of picketing is 
sufficient to establish its categorical coerciveness. Rather, as 
Tree Fruits and Thornhill acknowledged, picketing is not nec-
essarily a coercive act.215 Certainly, it has the potential to 
 
 210. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 70–71; Anderson, supra note 16, at 
830; Beard, supra note 15, at 218–19.  
 211. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 69–71. 
 212. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 
(1982) (treating a secondary labor boycott as inherently coercive conduct). 
 213. Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 
1264–66 (11th Cir. 2005) (analyzing whether a mock funeral procession was 
more analogous to unlawful picketing or lawful handbilling); see also Sheet 
Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 438 (determining whether secondary 
activity amounts to lawful handbilling or coercive and illicit picketing). 
 214. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 438 (noting that if the 
behavior in question was the “‘functional equivalent of picketing’ . . . [it was] 
therefore coercive and unlawful”). 
 215. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 71–72 (1964) (refusing to find that all consumer 
picketing is coercive and prohibited under the NLRA); Thornhill v. Alabama, 
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coerce listeners, whether through violence, serious threats, con-
frontational conduct, obstruction of entryways, or other accom-
panying activity.216 However, like in Safeco, much labor picket-
ing may be wholly peaceful, orderly, and unintimidating.217 
Second, the presupposition of coerciveness is undermined by 
Claiborne Hardware’s extension of constitutional protection to 
public-issue picketing.218 If all picketing, no matter how benign, 
is inherently coercive, then it would be difficult to justify First 
Amendment protection for conduct that necessarily precludes 
reasoned and voluntary discourse.  
Not only does the inherently coercive argument fail to jus-
tify a categorical ban on peaceful picketing, it also cannot ac-
count for the selective prohibition of secondary labor picketing. 
Essentially, if all picketing is inherently coercive, then all pick-
eting should be subject to regulation on the same terms as la-
bor picketing. However, Claiborne Hardware’s hierarchical dis-
tinction between public-issue and labor picketing clearly 
repudiates this notion.219 Moreover, if this were the case, why 
should we permit primary labor picketing, as the NLRA ex-
pressly does?220 
2. The Inadequacy of the Speech-Plus Rationale 
In a certain sense, the speech-plus argument attempts to 
evade the problem of selectively excluding or prohibiting labor 
picketing. As advanced by Justice Stevens in Safeco, the 
speech-plus argument contends that labor picketing can be en-
joined because it calls for a reflexive and unthinking “response 
to a signal, rather than a reasoned response to an idea.”221 
Thus, in the labor context, picketing can be barred without im-
plicating free speech guarantees because it elicits automatic ef-
fects irrespective of the ideas disseminated.222 There are two 
 
310 U.S. 88, 105–06 (1940) (rejecting the argument that violence, breaches of 
the peace, or invasion of privacy rights are inherent attributes of picketing). 
 216. See Note, supra note 20, at 952. 
 217. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 
U.S. 607, 609–10 (1980) (describing how picketers merely carried signs and 
distributed handbills); see also Note, supra note 20, at 952–53 (“[M]uch con-
sumer picketing . . . is wholly peaceful.”). 
 218. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911, 913 (1982). 
 219. See id. at 913, 915. 
 220. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (2000) (excluding primary labor picketing from the statutory 
ban). 
 221. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 222. See id. 
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crucial facets to note about the rationale. First, it assumes that 
labor picketing is more than speech because Americans tend to 
respond sympathetically to union protests. Second, it is funda-
mentally a cunning, though narrower, reiteration of the inhe-
rently coercive argument. That is, in the labor context, there 
presumably exists a unique and insidious mechanism by which 
even peaceful picketing elicits automatic responses indepen-
dent of any message conveyed. As such, it can be said to “coer-
cively” trigger involuntary and thoughtless reactions. 
Given its affinity with the inherently coercive argument, 
the speech-plus argument is vulnerable to similar criticism. 
Like its intellectual kin, it rests on the specious premise that 
labor picketing coerces its listeners into thoughtlessly capitu-
lating to union demands. Experience, however, does not appear 
to vindicate such a supposition. Moreover, even assuming that 
union picketing precipitates reflexive responses based on gen-
eral attitudes towards labor, it is not unique in harboring the 
potential for inducing action irrespective of ideas. Other forms 
of constitutionally protected expression, such as civil rights or 
abortion protests, may also elicit reflexive responses based on 
an individual’s general attitude or deeply ingrained beliefs.223 
Yet, if Stevens’s argument were to stand, it would militate to-
wards diminished protection for any public appeal to deeply en-
trenched beliefs of any kind. Since many public protests—
whether championing racial equality or deriding abortion 
rights—may elicit automatic responses, they would also be vul-
nerable to attack and lessened protection on speech-plus 
grounds. Ultimately, since the inducement of automatic res-
ponses is not an idiosyncratic attribute of labor picketing, the 
speech-plus argument fails to account for the disparate treat-
ment of labor and nonlabor speech. 
 
 223. For example, although Americans have shown deep and inveterate 
respect for religious values and the sanctity of life, this has not been grounds 
to subject abortion protests to diminished or nonexistent First Amendment 
protection. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773–74 
(1994) (affirming the First Amendment right of abortion protestors to carry 
offensive placards and convey unpalatable messages); see also Rakoczy, supra 
note 28, at 1640 (discussing the Claiborne Hardware Court’s approval of pick-
eting to encourage the boycotting of stores that refused to support racial inte-
gration as constitutionally protected). 
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3. The Inadequacy of the Special Congressional Balancing 
Rationale 
A third approach to the selective exclusion of secondary la-
bor picketing from constitutional protection is the special con-
gressional balancing argument. Inaugurated by Justice Black-
mun’s concurrence in Safeco,224 the argument was resurrected 
in Claiborne Hardware to differentiate labor picketing from 
“public-issue” picketing.225 As formulated by Justice Blackmun, 
prohibition of secondary labor picketing is permissible as an in-
stance of Congress striking a balance between union freedom of 
speech and the ability of neutral parties “to remain free from 
coerced participation in industrial strife.”226 Accordingly, diffe-
rential treatment of labor and nonlabor picketing is justified 
because Congress holds a uniquely robust interest in prevent-
ing coerced participation in economic discord. 
Although the special balancing rationale eschews the prob-
lem of general prohibition, it fails to cogently justify a selective 
prohibition on labor picketing. First, as trenchantly observed in 
Sheet Metal Workers’ International Ass’n, the proposition does 
nothing to clarify the meaning or scope of coercion.227 It merely 
begs the question of what activity constitutes coercion and, cor-
relatively, can be prohibited under the NLRA. Consequently, if 
labor picketing is not necessarily coercive, then it can be im-
plemented without triggering Congress’s interest in preventing 
coerced participation in industrial strife. Second, it is not alto-
gether clear why the government possesses, or should possess, 
a greater interest in preventing coerced participation in indus-
trial strife as opposed to racial strife, political strife, ideological 
strife, or religious strife.228 As such, the view does not ade-
quately account for the distinction between labor and nonlabor 
protests over potentially polarizing social issues. Additionally, 
as International Longshoremen’s Ass’n explicitly observed, it is 
 
 224. See Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617–18 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 225. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912–13 (1982). 
 226. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617–18 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 227. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 
437 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 228. Justice Blackmun’s articulation of the balancing rationale simply in-
voked Congress’s interest in preventing industrial strife. See Safeco, 447 U.S. 
at 617–18 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Likewise, in Claiborne Hardware, the 
Court merely invoked the strong governmental interest in economic regula-
tion; it did not provide any detailed rationale as to why there is a greater in-
terest in preventing economic discord over sociopolitical strife. See Claiborne 
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 912. 
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often difficult to distinguish pickets aimed solely at political 
change and those seeking purely economic aims.229 A boycott, 
as in Claiborne Hardware, may integrate both objectives.230 In 
such circumstances, it becomes quite difficult to determine 
whether Congress maintains a superlative regulatory interest 
since speech may facilitate both industrial and political strife. 
4. The Inadequacy of the Commercial Speech Rationale 
The labor-speech-as-commercial-speech argument is the fi-
nal commonly espoused rationale for singling out union activity 
for diminished constitutional protection. The view rests on the 
premise that there exists a hierarchy of First Amendment val-
ues, with political or public-issue speech at its apex and com-
mercial or economic speech occupying a subordinate echelon.231 
Due to its comparatively low hierarchical position, commercial 
speech is subject to both decreased constitutional protection 
and increased governmental regulation.232 Within this concep-
tual framework, the rationale posits an equivalence between 
labor and commercial speech because the former purportedly 
concerns parochial economic interests, rather than matters of 
important public concern.233 Thus, in contrast to public-issue or 
political speech, labor speech is said to be subject to selective 
exclusion or prohibition.234 
Since its delineation in Claiborne Hardware, the distinc-
tion between labor and political speech was significantly weak-
ened by DeBartolo II’s suggestion that certain forms of union 
activity might constitute political speech of public concern.235 
 
 229. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225 
(1982) (“The distinction between labor and political objectives would be diffi-
cult to draw in many cases.”). 
 230. The civil rights boycott in Claiborne Hardware included demands for 
racial desegregation as well as jobs for African Americans. Claiborne Hard-
ware, 458 U.S. at 899–900. 
 231. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466–67 (1980) (declaring that pub-
lic-issue picketing “has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of 
First Amendment values”); see also Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913 
(quoting Carey’s declaration that public-issue speech rests on the highest tier 
of First Amendment values). 
 232. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 913, 915.  
 233. See id. (distinguishing public-issue boycotts from boycotts with merely 
economic interests). 
 234. See id. at 914–15 (implying that boycotts with merely economic inter-
ests would be subject to regulation or prohibition).  
 235. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council (DeBartolo II), 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988) (“We do not suggest 
that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech va-
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Nevertheless, the distinction remains intact as a potential, if 
not actual, impediment to comparable First Amendment guar-
antees for labor and public-issue communication. Unfortunate-
ly, like the other rationales assessed, the labor-speech-as-
commercial-speech argument fails to provide a principled justi-
fication for differential protection. 
There are at least two salient reasons why the commercial 
speech rationale fails to justify asymmetric protection for labor 
and political speech. First, as declared in International Long-
shoremen’s Ass’n, it is often difficult to distinguish pickets em-
bodying purely political objectives from those advocating mere 
economic change.236 Even the civil rights boycott in Claiborne 
Hardware involved appeals to achieve economic gains for a spe-
cific social group, not simply demands for political or racial 
equality.237 In fact, of all the Supreme Court cases involving 
secondary protests, the boycott in International Longshore-
men’s Ass’n was arguably the most manifestly political since it 
lacked the intermediate or ancillary aim of economic gain.238 
Nevertheless, the boycott’s political and moral objection to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presented no obstacle to its ul-
timate prohibition.239 The point, however, is that in our post-
laissez-faire society, where government intervention in most 
spheres of social and economic life is a quotidian affair, it is 
impossible to delineate an objective distinction between politi-
cal and economic speech.240 This is because both spheres of ac-
tivity significantly and mutually impact one another.241 Under 
such circumstances, the labor-political distinction does not offer 
a coherent or consistent framework for determining the requi-
site level of constitutional protection for a given protest. 
More importantly, it is analytically unsound, historically 
myopic, and fundamentally biased to equate labor speech with 
 
riety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection. The 
handbills involved here, however, do not appear to be typical commercial 
speech . . . for they pressed the benefits of unionism to the community . . . .”). 
 236. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 225 
(1982). 
 237. One of the goals sought in Claiborne Hardware was to provide jobs for 
African Americans, surely an economic or labor-related aim. See Claiborne 
Hardware, 458 U.S. at 899–900. 
 238. Getman, supra note 48, at 17; see Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456 U.S. 
at 222–23 (detailing how the withholding of union labor was strictly motivated 
by the objection to Soviet military policy). 
 239. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456 U.S. at 223–26. 
 240. Atleson, supra note 18, at 165, 167.  
 241. See id. 
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commercial speech that simply proposes a commercial transac-
tion or is solely related to economic self-interest.242 Rather, the 
premises of Thornhill and Swing remain valid; peaceful labor 
picketing extends beyond mere matters of private economic 
concern to issues of fundamental public interest.243 As articu-
lated in Thornhill, the welfare of present and future genera-
tions depends on labor matters—whether satisfactory hours, 
fair wages, or hospitable working conditions—and their wide-
spread repercussions.244 Additionally, the panoply of labor-
related legislation attests to the fact that labor relations are 
not matters of mere parochial concern, but of great interest to 
the general polity.245 Absent the potential for such interest and 
concomitant support, there would seem to be little reason for 
the bevy of economic and labor-related legislation.  
Not only do labor protests implicate matters of public con-
cern, there is also no persuasive argument for why union activi-
ty cannot and should not be deemed political action. Both labor 
and nonlabor boycotts may reflect a broader goal of redistribut-
ing economic benefits, whether to minorities or workers.246 Just 
as race or gender discrimination may highlight a broader phe-
nomenon of social inequity, a labor dispute signifies the posi-
tion of workers in an economic system based on private and li-
mited ownership of the means of production.247 Yet we do not 
characterize women’s appeals for higher wages and equality of 
remuneration as reflecting parochial commercial interests be-
reft of public or political concern. Why then should we charac-
 
 242. Commercial speech has been defined as speech that merely proposes a 
commercial transaction or is solely related to narrow economic interests. Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 762 (1976). 
 243. See Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 326 (1941) (“The inter-
dependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has be-
come a commonplace. The right of free communication cannot therefore be 
mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even 
though they are not in his employ.” (citation omitted)); Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940) (“[L]abor relations are not matters of mere local or pri-
vate concern. Free discussion concerning . . . labor disputes appears to us in-
dispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular gov-
ernment to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.”). 
 244. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 103. 
 245. Id. (“The merest glance at state and federal legislation on the subject 
demonstrates the force of the argument that labor relations are not matters of 
mere local or private concern.”). 
 246. See Getman, supra note 48, at 17. 
 247. Note, supra note 20, at 955.  
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terize labor protests in such a way? After all, in a social system 
where health care and higher education are largely privatized 
and quite expensive, labor speech aimed at immediate economic 
gains signals broader, more fundamental concerns. That is, this 
speech marks an attempt to secure a better life for oneself, 
one’s family, one’s descendants, and for other workers facing 
unsatisfactory wages and prohibitive costs. Given this reality, 
it is inaccurate and belittling to equate labor protests with 
mere profit-making activity such as product advertising.248 
Moreover, to do so seems to reflect nothing more than a pre-
judicial vestige of Cold War antipathy to union activity and la-
bor demands. How else do we account for the refusal in Interna-
tional Longshoremen’s Ass’n to establish an exception to the 
secondary boycott ban for politically based disputes with for-
eign nations?249 If even political and morally righteous union 
activity can be blithely proscribed, then the distinction between 
labor and political speech seems to reflect nothing more than 
class bias. 
C. THE REPUGNANT RESIDUE OF CONTENT-BASED REGULATION 
Given the inadequacy of the articulated rationales for 
meaningfully differentiating labor and nonlabor picketing, we 
are left with nothing but unconstitutional content-based dis-
crimination. As Mosley made clear, selective exclusion from 
public fora may not be based on content alone and may not be 
justified by reference to content alone.250 Yet, without a persua-
sive rationale for selectively restricting secondary labor picket-
ing, what is left but the content of speech itself? Consequently, 
since the subject matter of the speech—labor or nonlabor—
appears to be the determinative factor in applicable levels of 
protection and regulation, the asymmetrical treatment of labor 
and nonlabor boycotts constitutes an impermissible content-
based restriction.251 To avoid this constitutional quandary, it is 
necessary to interpret the NLRA’s secondary boycott ban as 
 
 248. As noted, the exemplar of commercial speech is advertising the price 
or merits of commodities. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. 
& Constr. Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988). 
 249. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 224–
25 (1982). 
 250. See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94–96 (1972). 
 251. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461–65 (1980) (invalidating a pick-
eting ordinance that discriminated on the basis of subject matter); Mosley, 408 
U.S. at 95–96 (abrogating a picketing ordinance whose “operative distinction 
is the message on a picket sign”).  
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prohibiting only those types of protest activity not protected by 
generally applicable First Amendment precepts and precedent. 
Accordingly, we must construct a new methodological frame-
work for interpreting section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)’s ban on coercive sec-
ondary activity to ensure it remains within constitutional lim-
its.  
III.  A NEW MODEL OF COERCION   
A. TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTION OF COERCION 
To bring the NLRA’s ban on coercive secondary labor boy-
cotts back within First Amendment bounds, it is necessary to 
interpret section 8(b)(4)(ii)’s prohibition on coercion in a way 
that does not conflict with comparable activity protected when 
undertaken by other social groups. As a practical matter, this 
means constructing a new definition and methodology for un-
derstanding the meaning and scope of coercion. A conventional 
definition of coercion is conduct that “overwhelm[s the] will” of 
another.252 As the definition indicates, the concept of coercion 
involves two facets: a relational component (i.e., the other 
whose will is overcome) and a substantive component (i.e., the 
conduct that overwhelms). Thus, we must determine both the 
substantive content of “coercion,” as well as the perspective 
from which it is to be assessed. 
1. The Customer Is King: The Relational Component of 
Coercion 
Coercion is clearly a relational concept. One neither coerces 
in the abstract nor coerces oneself; coercion is always coercion 
of another. Thus, a preliminary inquiry is from whose perspec-
tive do we assess the coerciveness of conduct? In the context of 
secondary consumer boycotts, there are two possible perspec-
tives—that of the consumer and that of the secondary business. 
As the case law reveals, there has been ambiguity and inconsis-
tency in whether coercion is a function of potential economic 
harm to a secondary business or a function of the effects on 
targeted consumers.253 The distinction between the two, how-
 
 252. Jones, supra note 31, at 1028. 
 253. Coercion was judged from the perspective of the immediate consumer 
audience in DeBartolo II, Tree Fruits, and Thornhill. See DeBartolo II, 485 
U.S. at 578–80; NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 
760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 72–73 (1964); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88, 104 (1940). In contrast, coercion was assessed in relation to the economic 
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ever, is critical. We must not confuse coercion of immediate lis-
teners with economic pressure exerted as a result of those free-
ly complying with union appeals.254 In other words, it is analyt-
ically unsound to equate speech that persuades listeners to 
exert economic pressure by freely withholding patronage with 
speech that is itself coercive. 
Given the need to specify the perspective from which coer-
cion is assessed, there are several reasons for analyzing it from 
the vantage point of the consumer. First, and probably the least 
persuasive argument, is precedent. As both DeBartolo II and 
Claiborne Hardware suggest, coercion should be understood as 
a function of the impact exerted upon consumers or immediate 
listeners.255 Consequently, labor picketing should not be devoid 
of constitutional protection because it may induce others to 
take action inconsistent with the economic interests of a sec-
ondary business. As Claiborne Hardware indicated, the fact 
that a boycott has a substantial impact on merchants does not 
render it subject to proscription absent a finding that “fear ra-
ther than protected conduct” was the dominant force behind its 
public support.256 
A second reason for analyzing coercion from a consumer 
perspective emerges when one considers that every expression 
of opinion may potentially induce action unfavorable to one so-
cial group.257 As such, the mere presence of action inconsistent 
with one’s interests should not be grounds for prohibiting oth-
 
repercussions attending a secondary business in International Longshoremen’s 
Ass’n and Safeco. See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 456 U.S. at 223; NLRB v. Re-
tail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 613–14 (1980). 
The inconsistent approach to analyzing coercion is also evident in the recent 
circuit split over the status of a mock funeral procession. Compare Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 437–38 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 
(focusing on the effects of coercion on potential patrons), with Kentov v. Sheet 
Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265–66 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(concentrating on the fact that a secondary boycott was aimed at exerting 
pressure on a secondary business by dissuading patronage). 
 254. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 830–31. 
 255. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 578 (noting the lack of any suggestion 
that the labor activity had a coercive impact on “customers”); NAACP v. Clai-
borne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909–10 (1982) (focusing on the manner in 
which listeners or patrons were enlisted in the boycott). 
 256. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 934.  
 257. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 104 (“Every expression of opinion on matters 
that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in the interests of 
one rather than another group in society. But the group in power . . . may not 
impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discussion . . . [by] showing 
that others may thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its in-
terests.”). 
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erwise protected and peaceful expression. Just because a politi-
cal organization may persuade a considerable portion of the 
electorate to “boycott” an incumbent candidate or a particular 
piece of legislation does not mean that the incumbent was 
“coerced” into leaving office or abandoning the legislation. Un-
der our democratic and republican system of governance, such 
advocacy is a legitimate and prized exercise of liberty, not a 
coercive tactic to be decried and forbidden.258 Our free market 
economy is similarly premised on the notion that individual 
consumers possess economic freedom for which businesses 
compete.259 If a union peacefully persuades consumers to exer-
cise this freedom in a manner inconsistent with the economic 
interests of a business, it is inaccurate to claim that the busi-
ness was unlawfully coerced.260 Yet, if coercion were premised 
on economic harm, any consumer appeal to undertake a “wholly 
legal course of action”261 could be prohibited as coercive activi-
ty. 
The foregoing discussion suggests yet another difficulty in 
analyzing coercion pursuant to the economic harm attending a 
secondary business. Essentially, to do so would proscribe other 
authorized and protected inducements to boycott such as leaf-
lets, newspaper ads, or public speeches.262 Since these constitu-
tionally protected activities can exert economic consequences 
comparable to peacefully persuasive picketing, judging coercion 
 
 258. Cf. BRUCE MIROFF ET AL., DEBATING DEMOCRACY 2–3 (1997) (discuss-
ing how free and fair debate, including the freedom to persuade and delibe-
rate, is the “lifeblood of democracy”). 
 259. See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, in MIROFF ET AL., su-
pra note 258, at 56, 60–61 (discussing the relationship between the free mar-
ket system and economic freedom: “free to enter or not enter into any particu-
lar [economic] exchange”). 
 260. See DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 580 (“The loss of customers because they 
read a handbill urging them not to patronize a business . . . is the result of 
mere persuasion, and the neutral who reacts is doing no more than what its 
customers honestly want it to do.”). 
 261. See id. at 575. 
 262. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907, 909–11 
(1982) (observing that speeches, newspaper articles, and pamphleteering are 
forms of communication generally protected under the First Amendment); see 
also DeBartolo II, 485 U.S. at 576 (indicating that a prohibition on leafleting 
the general public would “pose a substantial issue of validity under the First 
Amendment”); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 
760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 69 (1964) (suggesting that a prohibition on leaf-
leting, radio broadcasts, and newspaper advertisements would pose serious 
First Amendment implications); 105 CONG. REC. 17,818, 17,898–99 (1959) 
(statement of Sen. Kennedy) (explaining that the secondary boycott ban was 
not meant to prohibit handbilling, newspaper ads, or radio broadcasts). 
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from the perspective of a secondary business would necessitate 
that they be enjoined as coercive activity. Thus, a business-
based conception of coercion does not allow for drawing a mea-
ningful distinction between activities such as handbilling and 
barricading an entryway, since both could exert grave economic 
harm. Coercion would therefore be converted into an overinclu-
sive concept covering both protected and unprotected conduct. 
To avoid such a scenario, coercion should be limited to the ef-
fects on an intended and immediate audience: the consumers 
themselves. 
The perspectival problem of coercion can also be ap-
proached from a slightly different angle, analogizing it to 
another constitutional dilemma—that of the heckler’s veto.263 
The heckler’s veto presents the following problem: what if the 
danger of speech arises from the reactions of a hostile crowd, 
rather than from a sympathetic and immediate audience?264 
Several Supreme Court cases confronting the issue reject the 
proposition that the reaction of a hostile audience justifies the 
suppression of otherwise permissible First Amendment activi-
ty.265 For example, in Terminiello v. Chicago, a racist dema-
gogue addressing a sympathetic audience sparked agitation 
and violence amongst a hostile crowd situated outside the 
speaking forum.266 The speaker was subsequently arrested and 
convicted of violating a statute that prohibited stirring the pub-
lic to anger, inviting dispute, or fomenting unrest.267 Reversing 
the conviction, the Supreme Court suggested that any danger 
or disorder arising from a hostile crowd reaction cannot justify 
suppression of speech unless it is likely “to produce a clear and 
present danger . . . that rises far above public inconvenience, 
 
 263. For a general discussion of the heckler’s veto or hostile audience prob-
lem, see JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 
80–83 (2d ed. 2000). 
 264. Id. at 80. 
 265. See Gregory v. City of Chi., 394 U.S. 111, 111–13 (1969) (rejecting the 
claim that the unruly acts of onlookers could justify the suppression of an oth-
erwise peaceful civil rights march); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 
(1949) (overturning the conviction of a speaker who stirred a hostile crowd to 
anger and unrest); see also Vill. of Skokie v. Nat’l Socialist Party of Am., 373 
N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. 1978) (“‘[I]t has become patent that a hostile audience is not 
a basis for restraining otherwise legal First Amendment activity.’” (quoting 
Collin v. Chi. Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 1972))). 
 266. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 2–3; see id. at 16, 20–22 (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing). 
 267. Id. at 2–3 (majority opinion). 
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annoyance, or unrest.”268 Of course, such a position makes in-
tuitive sense. If a heckler’s veto could be used to censor speech, 
then hostile crowds could simply feign offense or threaten dis-
order in order to suppress unpopular sentiments.  
The position of secondary businesses can be compared to 
hostile crowds on two grounds. First, both entities are relative-
ly remote; that is, they are not the immediately intended ad-
dressees of the expression. In a secondary consumer boycott, 
the consumer is the immediately intended recipient of the mes-
sage.269 Similarly, in a case like Terminiello, the individuals in 
the auditorium—not the hostile crowd outside—are the imme-
diately intended addressees.270 Second, both entities are pre-
disposed to resent the expression because it conflicts with their 
interests—social, political, economic, or otherwise. To complete 
the analogy, if the potentially dangerous effects of speech on a 
hostile crowd cannot justify its suppression, then the possible 
harmful effects on a secondary business should likewise be in-
sufficient grounds to censor labor expression. Of course, this 
assumes that the speech in question does not coerce its in-
tended and potentially sympathetic audience. But this is the 
point—coercion should be assessed from the vantage point of its 
principally intended audience. Moreover, if we are bound to ap-
ply similar standards to labor and nonlabor speech, then the 
Court’s rejection of a heckler’s veto provides a final basis for 
construing coercion from the perspective of consumers. 
2. Formal Equality and Objectively Reasonable People: The 
Substance of Coercion 
Having dispensed with the relational component of coer-
cion, it remains to articulate its substance. In the context of 
secondary consumer boycotts, the inquiry can be framed as fol-
lows: from the perspective of a potential patron, what types of 
union activity would or should be deemed coercive? The query 
can be answered at two complementary levels of analysis or  
generality: a macrolevel and a microlevel. At the macrolevel, 
union activity protected under general First Amendment pre-
cepts and precedent must not be prohibited as coercive conduct, 
lest we resurrect the specter of content-based discrimination. 
At the microlevel, we can employ an objective reasonable per-
 
 268. Id. at 4. 
 269. See Vlasek, supra note 33, at 181 (describing how secondary boycotts 
target otherwise neutral parties, such as customers). 
 270. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 2–3. 
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son standard to determine whether the conduct truly exerts a 
coercive impact on consumers. 
a. The Macrolevel of Analysis 
To evade the constitutional quandary of content-based re-
strictions, we must understand the content of coercion in a 
manner that does not conflict with general First Amendment 
guarantees. On a formal level, this proposition entails that 
conduct protected in nonlabor contexts should not be characte-
rized as coercive or unlawful when undertaken by a labor un-
ion. Although this principle of formal equality does nothing to 
delineate the specific content of protected conduct, it is meant 
to provide a limit to governmental regulation of union activity. 
To delineate the specific content of coercion, however, we can 
look to First Amendment decisions within and without the la-
bor context. 
Without embarking upon the abstract and amorphous ter-
rain of constitutional scrutiny levels, there are two general 
First Amendment doctrines that help to sketch the content and 
contours of coercion. First, the Supreme Court has long held 
that there is a narrow set of speech categories that cannot 
claim First Amendment protection and, therefore, are subject 
to complete regulation.271 These categories of unprotected 
speech include fighting words, true threats, obscenity, speech 
that presents a clear and present danger, and speech that is 
likely to incite imminent lawlessness.272 Of course, picketing is 
more than speech, combining both speech and nonspeech ele-
ments.273 Consequently, a second First Amendment doctrine is 
relevant to the issue of picketing—labor or otherwise. 
Under the speech-plus doctrine, or expression-action di-
chotomy, the First Amendment does not protect those non-
speech elements that may induce action irrespective of the 
ideas communicated.274 In other words, public protests lose 
 
 271. Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843, 
844–45 (2005); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927–
28 (1982) (outlining the few categories of speech that are not protected by the 
First Amendment). 
 272. See Kitrosser, supra note 271, at 844–45; Mackson-Landsberg, supra 
note 24, at 1529–30. 
 273. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 
U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); WHITEHEAD, supra note 14, at 
73. 
 274. See Safeco, 447 U.S. at 619 (Stevens, J., concurring) (invoking the 
speech-conduct distinction to justify barring labor picketing that does not call 
GANIN_4FMT 5/24/2008  11:38 AM 
2008] SECONDARY LABOR BOYCOTTS 1579 
 
their First Amendment protection when they induce action 
through force of conduct rather the strength of ideas.275 Pro-
tests may thus be regulated where they achieve their ends 
through “intimidat[ion] by a line of picketers”276 or where “fear 
rather than protected conduct [is] the dominant force” behind 
their public support.277 
Combining the two doctrines, we can formulate a prelimi-
nary test for determining whether boycott activity is constitu-
tionally protected and, thus, immune from prohibition under 
section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Essentially, as long as a union does not 
engage in activity that consists of fighting words, true threats, 
a call to imminent illegal action, or conduct that induces action 
independent of ideas, it should not be deemed coercive under 
the NLRA.  
b. The Microlevel of Analysis 
The preliminary formulation of the coercion test leaves one 
fundamental question unresolved. Namely, how do we deter-
mine what conduct coercively induces action irrespective of the 
strength of the ideas communicated? The answer is actually 
somewhat implicit in the foregoing First Amendment analysis. 
Take, for example, the definition of fighting words as speech 
“likely to provoke the average person to retaliation.”278 Some-
what similarly, obscenity has been defined, inter alia, as ma-
terial that “the average person” would view as appealing to 
prurient interests279 and for which no reasonable person would 
find serious value.280 These categories of unprotected conduct, 
thus, include an objective reasonable or ordinary person stan-
dard for determining whether or not an activity is entitled to 
constitutional protection. Conjoining this latent standard with 
the traditional definition of coercion as conduct that “over-
 
for a reasoned response to an idea). 
 275. See id. 
 276. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 580 (1988). 
 277. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 934 (1982). 
 278. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942); see also Tex-
as v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (reiterating the “average person” stan-
dard).  
 279. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (promulgating a tripar-
tite obscenity test that includes an average person standard). 
 280. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987) (declaring that the 
third prong of the Miller obscenity test should rest on a reasonable person 
standard).  
GANIN_4FMT 5/24/2008  11:38 AM 
1580 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1539 
 
whelm[s the] will,”281 we can employ an objective reasonable 
person test to answer the lingering question of coercion.282  
When union activity does not fall within a category of un-
protected speech, it can only be prohibited when it is so sub-
stantial that no reasonable person, no person of ordinary forti-
tude, would feel at liberty to ignore the union’s demands. This 
is what may be termed the microlevel of analysis. The appella-
tion is meant to emphasize that the proposed reasonable person 
test is not distinct from the general First Amendment inquiry. 
Rather, it merely serves to underscore what is arguably already 
implicit in the latter. The hope is that the reasonable person 
standard will provide greater guidance in identifying coercion, 
while ensuring that regulated conduct does not fall within First 
Amendment bounds. As such, it remains imperative that the 
standard abide by the principle of formal equality—that labor 
and nonlabor protests receive comparable constitutional protec-
tion. 
Under the proposed reasonable person test, the following 
activities—all of which have been noted by courts—are likely to 
constitute coercion under the NLRA: violence, serious threats, 
physical and symbolic obstruction of entryways, interference 
with the ingress or egress of consumers, or other confrontation-
al or intimidating conduct.283 The reason for this is quite sim-
ple: the enumerated activities are likely to overcome the will of 
a person of ordinary fortitude, leaving her unable to freely dis-
regard union pressure and patronize a secondary business. The 
 
 281. Jones, supra note 31, at 1028. 
 282. Interestingly, an ordinary person standard was invoked in Sheet Met-
al Workers’ International Ass’n to bolster its protection of a mock funeral pro-
cession. See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 
439 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the claim of coercion on the grounds that the 
protest was not “one by which a person of ordinary fortitude would be intimi-
dated”). 
 283. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. 
Trades Council (DeBartolo II ), 485 U.S. 568, 578–80 (1988) (protecting a labor 
boycott that did not involve intimidation by a line of picketers, violence, or pa-
trolling); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 
(Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58, 60–61, 71–73 (1964) (upholding the legitimacy of a 
peaceful picket that did not interfere with the ingress of consumers or obstruct 
deliveries); Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 437–38 (protecting a 
boycott that was orderly, did not physically interfere with or confront patrons, 
and did not create a symbolic barrier to entry via patrolling); Overstreet v. 
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 
1199, 1202, 1211–12 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding a boycott that did not involve 
confrontational conduct or the creation of a physical or symbolic barrier to 
consumer entry). 
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foregoing list, however, is not an exhaustive account of coercive 
labor activity. Rather, it illustrates the types of conduct likely 
to satisfy the reasonable person standard for coercion. Never-
theless, absent truly coercive activity, unions should be free to 
engage in peaceful picketing. 
Synthesizing the macrolevel and microlevels of analysis, 
we can define coercive activity, for purposes of section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B), as including unprotected speech and conduct so 
substantial that it would overcome the will of a reasonable and 
ordinary person. Essentially, so long as the boycott does not 
consist of fighting words, present a clear and present danger, 
incite imminent lawless conduct, or contain activity likely to 
overcome the will of a reasonable person of ordinary fortitude, 
the union should not be held to have committed an unfair labor 
practice under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Obviously, under the pro-
posed test of coercion, certain forms of peaceful picketing, as 
well as other boycott measures, can and should be considered 
legitimate exercises of First Amendment rights. Accordingly, 
the D.C. Circuit was correct in holding that the mock funeral 
procession was not coercive in violation of section 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).284 Given that the procession was orderly, noncon-
frontational, and occurred a hundred feet from the hospital en-
trance285—creating neither a physical or symbolic barrier to en-
try—it was not sufficient to prevent an ordinary person from 
patronizing the hospital. Although some may have found the 
spectacle distasteful, unnerving, and even offensive, it could 
not be considered coercive. 
B. IMPLICATIONS: VAGUENESS, THWARTED INTENT, OR 
ECONOMIC RUIN? 
There are at least three objections that the proposed coer-
cion test may confront. First, some may argue that the com-
plementary First Amendment and reasonable person analyses 
are still too general or vague. Since the primary concern of this 
Note is symmetrical protection for labor and nonlabor picket-
ing, such a general standard seems sufficient. Additionally, the 
proposed test might be advantageous insofar as it anticipates 
change and permits flexibility in First Amendment jurispru-
dence. All that it requires is uniformity of treatment for labor 
and nonlabor activities. 
 
 284. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 491 F.3d at 439. 
 285. Id. at 432–33, 438. 
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Second, some may argue that the test, by permitting cer-
tain forms of secondary picketing, undercuts the purpose of the 
secondary boycott ban. To the extent that this objection is accu-
rate, this is the proverbial price of living in an open and demo-
cratic society that values plurality of opinion and freedom of 
expression. Under such a system, Congress does not have the 
right to rescind or curtail free expression, nor to “grant the use 
of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny 
use to those wishing to express less favored or more controver-
sial views.”286 Moreover, if the unequivocal purpose behind the 
legislative ban is to protect “wholly neutral parties” from com-
pelled participation in labor disputes, the proposed test does 
not, as a practical matter, contravene that intent. Boycotts are 
presumably onerous, expensive, and time-consuming affairs. 
Accordingly, it seems unlikely that they would be employed 
against wholly neutral parties who have not economically sup-
ported or interacted with a primary target in some significant 
way. 
Third, some may claim that affording greater protection 
and latitude to labor boycott activities may exert a serious or 
calamitous impact on the economy. Although it is theoretically 
possible, it seems unlikely that secondary labor picketing will 
have grave economic repercussions. Again, given the onus of 
conducting such activity, it seems likely that unions would 
rarely institute such measures, especially where the secondary 
target is genuinely neutral vis-à-vis a labor dispute.  
  CONCLUSION   
Several recurring rationales have been espoused for ex-
empting secondary labor picketing from the robust First 
Amendment protection bestowed upon its public-issue analog. 
It has been argued that labor picketing is inherently coer-
cive,287 that it uniquely elicits reflexive responses independent 
of any ideas conveyed,288 that Congress maintains an incom-
parable interest in preventing “coerced participation in indus-
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trial strife,”289 and that labor speech is simply a form of low-
value commercial speech that merely implicates parochial eco-
nomic interests.290 For various, though occasionally overlapping 
reasons, none of these rationales justify drawing a meaningful 
distinction between labor and political picketing. In the absence 
of a sufficient rationale, the disparity of treatment seems to 
rest on the very content of speech—whether it is labor-related 
or not. As Sheet Metal Workers acknowledged in its own limited 
way, the disparity in treatment thereby amounts to impermis-
sible content-based discrimination.291  
To avoid the specter of content-based restriction, the 
NLRA’s ban on coercive secondary activity must be construed 
in a manner that conforms to general First Amendment pre-
cepts and precedent—those applicable to other public-issue 
pickets. In terms of perspective, this principle of equality ne-
cessitates that coercion be judged from the vantage point of the 
immediately intended recipients of the appeal. In secondary 
consumer boycotts, the relevant frame of reference is that of po-
tential patrons, not the secondary businesses subject to poten-
tial economic harm. Extending comparable protection also has 
an impact on our substantive understanding of coercion. At a 
macrolevel, it entails that activity protected under general 
First Amendment principles and case law must not be deemed 
unlawfully coercive when undertaken by a union. At a microle-
vel, this Note has proposed an objective reasonable person 
standard for determining whether labor conduct truly coerces 
consumers and, thus, can be constitutionally enjoined. Ulti-
mately, the concept of coercion should be limited to the narrow 
categories of unprotected speech and conduct so substantial 
that it would overcome the will of a reasonable person of ordi-
nary fortitude. Under this formulation, certain forms of sec-
ondary labor picketing can and should be considered legitimate 
exercises of First Amendment rights. 
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